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Browning: Must Attesting Witnesses Be Able to See Testator's Signature?
NOTE AND COMMENT
still it was entitled to qualified privilege because of the mutual
interest of sender and recipient.' But, of course, inasmuch as
the complaint charged malice, qualified privilege could not be
taken advantage of by demurrer. " Absolute privilege, on the
other hand, being independent of malice, may be shown on
demurrer where the facts giving rise to the privileged occasion
appear on the face of the complaint.'
Norman Hanson.

MUST ATTESTING WITNESSES BE ABLE TO SEE
TESTATOR'S SIGNATURE?
In only one case, In re Bragg's Estate,' has the Montana
Supreme Court been called upon to construe and apply the provisions of Section 6980, sub-section 2, R. C. M., 1935, which requires that, except as to holographicand nuncupative wills, "the
subscription must be made in the presence of the attesting witnesses, or be acknowledged by the testator to them to have been
made by him, or by his authority." Since, then, the Montana
law with respect to the sufficiency of an acknowledgment of a
signature not made in the presence of attesting witnesses depends upon the interpretation of this case, some consideration
of the opinion is justified. It is believed that, whatever may
be said of the correctness of the actual decision upon the facts,
the language of the opinion is such as to leave the rule of the
case obscure, and may lead to an interpretation of the case
which would be clearly opposed to the weight of authority in
jurisdictions having statutes similar to that of Montana.
Both of the attesting witnesses in this case testified that the
testatrix did not sign the instrument in their presence nor state
that her signature was subscribed thereto, but did declare it to
be her will and request them to witness. One of the witnesses

"The case would seem to fall under R. C. M., 1935, Sec. 5692(3), in view

of the investigative duties of the Board (cf. Pierstorff v. Gray's Auto
Shop, 58 Ida. 438, 74 P. (2d) 171 (1937)) and of the fact that the
employer was under Plan No. 1 of the Workmen's Compensation Act

(self-insurance).

"Pack v. Wakefield Item Co., 280 Mass. 451, 183 N. E. 70 (1932);
KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 13 F. Supp. 910 (W. D., Wash., 1936);
Rutledge v. Junior Order of United American Mechanics, 185 S. C.
142, 193 S.E. 434 (1937) ; Corwin v. Berkwitz, 190 App. Div. 952, 179
N. Y. Supp. 915 (1920); Pienhardt v. West, 217 Ala. 12, 115 So. 88
(1927) ; Locke v. Mitchell, 7 Cal. (2d) 599, 61 P. (2d) 922 (1936);
Powell v. American Towing & Lighterage Co., 131 Md. 539, 102 Atl.
747 (1917) ; 37 C. J. 50-51.
'Miles v. McGrath, 4 F. Supp. 603 (D. Md., 1933) ; Brown v. Cochran,
222 Iowa 34, 268 N. W. 585 (1936) ; Layne v. Kirby, 208 Cal. 694, 284
Pac. 441 (1930).
1106 Mont. 132, 76 P. (2d) 57 (1938).
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stated that he had read over the will and further testified: "I
would not swear that her signature was appended to it at the
time. I am quite sure it was but I could not exactly swear to it,
but I think it was there. I would say it was there if I was going
to swear." The other witness testified: "I did not look over the
will before I signed, but I heard her say it was her will. I
could not swear that her signature was on the will at the time
I signed it. My witnessing was on another page." The Supreme
Court held that the signature was properly acknowledged and
that the will should be admitted to probate.
The Court in the course of its opinion said: "The solution
of two questions will be determinative of the action: (1) May
the signature to a will be acknowledged by the testator to the
attesting witnesses by any other means than by spoken words?
(2) If one of the attesting witnesses provided for by the statute
did not see, nor, might have seen, the signature of the testator
on the will when the witness signed as an attesting witness, may
the will be denied probate for that reason?"' In several places
in the opinion the Court stated, apparently without qualification, that "the rule adhered to in the instant case accepts as an
acknowledgment of the signature to the will the declaration of
the testator publishing the instrument as his will."
The Court's affirmative answer to the first query is amply
supported.! But did the Montana Court, in giving a negative
answer to the second question and in using language such as that
quoted above, intend to announce the rule that the declaration
of the testator publishing the instrument as his will is a sufficient acknowledgment of his signature previously subscribed
thereto, irrespective of whether the attesting witnesses either saw
or might have seen the testator's signature? If so, then it may
be repeated that the Court has taken a position contrary to the
weight of authority under similar statutes.
It is true that a large majority of the States which have
adopted statutes modeled after the Statute of Frauds,' have interpreted that statute as requiring either signature by the testator in the presence of the witnesses or an acknowledgment of the
instrument (not necessarily of the signature) by the testator
in their presence. Consistently with this position, these courts
have held that it is not necessary that the witnesses either see,
or have an opportunity to see, the testator's signature to the in'106 Mont. at page 137, 76 P. (2d) at page 59.
'106 Mont. at page 151, 76 P. (2d) at page 66, and 106 Mont. at page
154, 76 P. (2d) at page 68.
'PAGE

ON WILLS,

Sec. 329, p. 525; 68 C. J. 696, 28 R. C. L. 122 Sec. 75.

'29 CAR. II, ch. 3, Sec. 5. (1676). "AlU devises and bequests of any land
or tenements . . . shall be in writing, and signed by the party so devising the same, or by some other person in his presence and by his
express direction, and shall be attested and subscribed in the presence
of the said devisor by three or four credible witnesses, or else they
shall be utterly void and of none effect."
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strument. ° Even under statutes of this type, however, a few
courts have required that there be the opportunity to see testator's signature as a condition to valid attestation.'
Montana's statute, See. 6980, however, like the statutes in
New York, California, New Jersey, and several other American
jurisdictions, is modeled after the English Statute of Victoria,'
and by its terms expressly requires that the testator sign in the
presence of the witnesses or that he acknowledge his signature
to them. The uniform construction under this type of statute
has been that "acknowledgment by testator is insufficient unless
the witnesses have an opportunity of seeing the signature of the
testator. If the attesting witnesses did not have an opportunity
of seeing the signature of the testator at the time of the execution of the will . .. the will is invalid; since testator has neither
signed in the presence of the witnesses, nor has he acknowledged
his signature in their presence within the meaning of the statutes."' This statement of the law is supported by a long
and uniform line of New York cases." Decisions of the New Jersey courts under a similar statute are in accord.' A study of the
6A

few comparatively recent cases are illustrative of the point: In re

Dougherty's Estate, 168 Mich. 281, 134 N.W. 24, 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 161
(1912) with a good note in the L.R.A. citation particularly complete
on English cases; Wersech v Phelps, 186 Ind. 290, 116 N.E. 49 (1917) ;
Valentine v. Second Baptist Church of Chicago, 293 Ill. 71, 127 N.E.
178 (1920) ; Thorton v. Thorton, 314 Ill. 360, 145 N.E. 603 (1924) ; and
see ScHouLER ON WILLS, Sec. 521, p. 593, and Sec, 527, p. 602; PAGo
ON WIuLS, Sec. 362, p. 580, and Sec. 330, p. 528; 68 C. J. 694 and 698,
Sees. 354 and 362.
'Perhaps the best known case of this group is Nunn v. Ehlert, 218 Mass.
471, 106 N.E. 163, L.R.A. 1915B 87 (1914). A large number of cases
may be found, which, though not controlling decisions for the proposition stated because the fact situation was not such as to necessitate
ruling upon the specific question, are at least in so far in accord that
they recognize that it is the 8ignature rather than the instrument
which is the subect of acknowledgment and refuse probate of the will
where the signature of testator was not visible. In re Ludwig's Estate, 79 Minn. 101, 81 N.W. 758 (1900); RicharIson v. Orth 40 Ore.
252, 66 Pac. 925, 69 Pac. 455 (1901) ; Albert v. Stafford, 123 Va. 338,
96 S.E. 761 (1918) ; Maxwell v. Lake, 127 Miss. 107, 88 So. 326 (1921).
I1 Vic. ch. 26, Se. 9 (1837).
'PAGE

ON WILLS,

Sec. 330, p. 528.

"Lewis v. Lewis, 11 N. Y. 220, affirming 13 Barb. 17 (1854) ; Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 77 N.Y. 596, affirming 16 Hun 97 (1878); In re Mackay's
Will, 110 N.Y. 611, 18 N.E. 433, 1 L.R.A. 491 (1888); In re Eakin's
Will, 13 Misc. Rep. 557, 35 N.Y.S. 489 (1895); In re McDougall's Will,
34 N.Y.S. 302, affirming 87 Hun 349 (1895); In re Laudy's Will, 148
N.Y. 404, 42 N.E. 1061 (1896) ; In re De Haas's Will, 41 N.Y.S. 696,
9 App. Div. 561 (1896) ; Matter of Keefe's Will, 155 App. Div. 575,
141 N.Y.S. 5 (affirmed In 209 N.Y. 535, 102 N.E. 104) (1913) ; Matter
of Cogan's Will, 184 App. Div. 198, 171 N.Y.S. 643 (affirmed in 226
N.Y. 694, 123 N.E. 860) (1918) ; In re Redway's Will, 238 App. Div.
653, 265 N.Y.S. 848 (affirmed in 265 N.Y. 579, 193 N.E. 301) (1933).
"In re Cole's Will, 47 Atl. 385 (N.J., 1900) ; In re Sage's Will, 90 N.J.
209, 107 AtI. 151 (affirmed in 90 N.J. 580, 107 At. 445) (1919). De-

cisions from Oregon and Minnesota, frequently cited In accord, have
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textwriters and cyclopedists discloses a singular uniformity of
opinion in agreement with the same proposition."
An examination of the opinion in the principal case reveals
that the Montana Court recognized as conflicting with its decision, two of the authorities cited above, viz., JARMAN ON WILLS
and the New York case In re Mackay's Will. On the other
hand the Court cited with approval, though upon other propositions, decisions from New York and California, and the New Jersey decisions generally, all of which recognize the doctrine that
no acknowledgment is sufficient which lacks the condition of opportunity for the witnesses to see testator's signature at the time
of attestation. That the very cases cited by the Montana Court
represent holdings inconsistent with the apparent rule of the
case would seem to indicate that the Court did not intend its
language to be interpreted in the manner suggested here. Reference to the "determinative" queries quoted above from the
Montana opinion suggests an alternative explanation for the
language of the decision. The wording of the second question
put by the court perhaps indicates that the Court may have intended to put its decision upon the ground that Section 10505
renders it unnecessary for the testator to acknowledge his will to
both of the attesting witnesses required under the statute. This
possibility is strengthened by the statement of the dissenting
justice that "It is my strong conviction that an acknowledgment
of subscription to one of the witnesses only is insufficient.'""
It seems probable that the section alluded to" was intended
to apply only to the general question of sufficiency of proof in
the trial of cases, and was not intended to render the mandate
of Section 6980, that "there must be two attesting witnesses," a
requirement of mere presence and mechanical subscription by
one of the two. While the section may justify the Court in admitting a will to probate on the favorable direct testimony of
one witness "entitled to full credit," even though he may not
be an attesting witness to the will at all, and may give evidence
in direct conflict with that of either or both of the attesting
witnesses, it can scarcely justify the Court in holding that the
formal requisites of due execution prescribed by the statute
need, in actual fact, be satisfied as to a single witness only. The
cases generally repudiate such a doctrine."
been set out above as falling under statutes similar to the Statute of
Frauds. An examination of the statutes of these States seems to
the writer to justify this classification.
'PAOE ON WILLS as above quoted, and also Sec. 362, pp. 579 and 80
SCHOULER ON WILLS, 6th Ed. See. 527, p. 602; 68 C. J. 698, See. 362; 28
R. C. L. 125, Sec. 81: Note in 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 161, cited above, JARMAN ON WILLS, 7th Ed. pp. 101, 102.
13106 Mont. at page 165. 76 P. (2d) at page 73.
USec. 10505. . "The direct evidence of one witness who is entitled to
full credit is sufficient for proof of any fact except perjury and treason."
'Mitchell v. Mitchell, supra; Matter of Keefe's Will, supra; Wood v.
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As suggested in the preceding paragraph, the case of In re
Bragg's Estate may be explained on the basis of the strong line
of authority holding that a will should not be allowed to fail because of the faulty memory, negligence, or evil motives of one or
both of the attesting witnesses, particularly in face of a perfect
attestation clause.'
James Browning.
Davis 191 Ga. 690, 131 S.E. 885 (1926) ; In re Redway's Will, 8upra,
PAGE ON WxLLS, Sec. 330, p. 529; SCHOULER ON WxLLS, Sec. 526, p. 601;
68 C. J. 699, Sec. 365.
"In re Miller's Estate, 37 Mont. 545, 97 Pac. 935 (1908) ; Trustees of
Audubon Seminary v. Calhoun, 25 N. Y. 422 (1862) ; Abbott v. Abbott,
41 Mich. 540, 2 N. W. 810 (1879) ; In re Will of Cotrell, 95 N. Y.
329, 5 Civ. Proc. R. 340 (1884) ; Laudy's Will, 161 N. Y. 429, 55 N. E.
914 (1900) ; Farley v. Farley, 50 N. J. Eq. 434, 26 Atl. 178 (1893) ;
Holyoke v. Sipp, 77 Neb. 394, 109 N. W. 506 (1906) ; In re Morley's
Will, 140 App. Div. 823, 125 N. Y. S. 886 (1910) ; In re Carey's Will,
56 Colo. 77, 137 Pac. 1175, 51 L. R. A. (N.S.) (1913) ; Woodstock
College of Baltimore v. Hankey, 129 Md. 675, 99 Atl. 962 (1917);
Appeal of Pope, 93 Conn. 53, 104 At. 241 (1918) ; Tyler's Estate,
121 Cal. 405, 53 Pac. 928 (1898) ; German Evangelical Bethel Church
of Concordia v. Reith, 327 Mo. 1098, 39 S. W. (2d) 1057 (1931) ; 76
A. L. R. 604 (note on effect of attestation clause) ; In re Warren's
Estate, 138 Ore. 283, 4 Pac. (2d) 635 (1931) (with note on failure of
memory, etc., of witnesses) ; PAGE ON WrLLS., Secs. 675-678, pp. 119
to 1126, and Sec. 355, p. 570; 68 C. J. 1019-1020, Secs. 801-802; 28
R. C. L., Sees. 372-373, pp. 372-373.
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